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Abstract
The conventional wisdom on nominal anchors is that exchange rate-based inflation stabilizations lead to
economic booms while monetary-based stabilizations lead to recessions.  This study finds strong
evidence against this view.  Rather than determining the path of economic growth, the choice of nominal
anchor appears to be endogenously determined by the state of the economy.   To peg or manage the
exchange rate, a high level of international reserves is important, especially when a government’s
credibility is low after a period of high inflation.  After controlling for the level of international reserves
and the rate of inflation, growth after monetary-based stabilizations does not significantly differ from
that following exchange rate-based stabilizations.    1Végh (1992) makes similar observations.
2Similarly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) considers the expansionary effects of ERBS and the




One of the most captivating questions in macroeconomics is whether anti-inflation programs
lead to output and employment losses.  Utilizing the traditional Phillips curve analysis, the answer would
be yes: reducing inflation does indeed lead to a short-run loss of employment and output.  More recently,
however, several authors have suggested that the answer to this question depends inherently on the
choice of the nominal anchor.  Kiguel and Liviatan (1992), for example, examine inflation stabilization
in several Latin American countries and Israel and report that "<stabilization programs that use the
exchange rate as the main nominal anchor are often associated with a business cycle that begins with a
boom and ends with a recession," whereas "stabilization programs that use the money supply as the
nominal anchor generally induce the expected Phillips curve result: lower inflation is accompanied by a
recession after the program is implemented."
1  Calvo and Végh (1994) summarize the choice between
exchange rate-based stabilization (ERBS) and monetary-based stabilization (MBS) as one of "recession
now versus later."
2  
While not everyone supports the view of a recession now versus later trade-off, there is typically
wide support for the view that fixing the exchange rate, at least in the early stages of an inflation
stabilization program, can facilitate the reduction of inflation with reduced transitional costs over just
money-based programs (see, for example, Bruno 1993, Dornbusch and Werner 1994, Edwards 1995a,
Fischer 1986, and Sachs 1996).  
Numerous models have been developed over the last decade to explain this dichotomy between
exchange rate- and monetary-based stabilizations.  Dornbusch (1982) and Rodriguez (1982) propose the     
3Of course, it may be the case that international reserves are also endogenously determined.  Countries
wishing to pursue a fixed exchange rate in the future may first begin to stabilize and build reserves. 
2
theory that reducing the rate of exchange-rate devaluation, in addition to sticky inflation and high capital
mobility, would lead to lower real interest rates and, hence, an economic boom.  Calvo (1986) and Calvo
and Végh (1993) explain this behavior as a lack of credibility.  If people believe that inflation will return,
consumption will shift from the future to the present, leading to increased short-run economic activity. 
Others note the positive supply effects of reducing inflation on labor (Roldos 1993) or capital (Roldos
1995, and Uribe 1996).  Rebelo and Végh (1995) analyze a two-sector, general equilibrium model in
which the credibility effects on demand are augmented by supply-side effects.    
  A problem with existing theories and stylized facts is that the selection of a stabilization program
is never a simple choice between an exchange rate or monetary anchor.  Nor is the outcome of the two
types of stabilization programs as consistent as the stylized facts make them appear.  To use the
exchange rate as a nominal anchor, a country with credibility problems first must have some
international reserves to defend the exchange rate.  Mexico's 1987 exchange rate-based stabilization, for
example, used $7.2 billion of $12.5 billion in reserves in one year to maintain the policy.  In 1995,
Mexico's anemic level of international reserves and weakened credibility would have made it virtually
impossible for the country to return to its highly managed exchange rate regime.  
In other words, the choice of nominal anchor may be endogenously determined by the state of
the economy.  Those countries with ample international reserves, higher credibility, and better prospects
for economic growth can pursue exchange rate-based stabilizations.  Countries with fewer international
reserves, diminished credibility, and weaker prospects for the future may have only the option of
monetary-based stabilizations.
3  The observation that economic growth appears to be higher after
exchange rate-based stabilizations may simply be the result of better economic prospects before the
stabilization began.  Indeed, Edwards (1995b) finds strong evidence that the greater a country's history of     
4The overall characteristics of international business cycles in fixed and floating exchange rate
regimes is well documented in Baxter and Stockman (1989).  They find no evidence to suggest that the
cyclic behavior of real macroeconomic aggregates depends systematically on the exchange-rate regime. 
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political instability and past inflation, the less likely is the country to pursue a fixed exchange rate
regime.  Endogeneity implies that there is no simple recession now versus later trade-off in the choice of
stabilization program.   
This paper examines the question of whether the choice of nominal anchor, by itself, matters in
affecting a nation’s short-run economic growth.  With data similar to that used in previous studies that
examine ERBS and MBS (i.e., Kiguel and Liviatan 1992, Végh 1992, Calvo and Végh 1994, and
Reinhart and Végh 1994), this study quantifies the importance and statistical significance of changes in
output growth around inflation stabilizations and examines the likelihood that the choice of stabilization
program is endogenously determined.  After controlling for the level of international reserves and
inflation, growth after monetary-based stabilizations does not differ significantly from that following
exchange rate-based stabilizations.  
II. Empirical Analysis
The following empirical analysis is designed to answer the question of whether the choice of
nominal anchor matters, in an ex ante way, in affecting a nation's short-run economic growth.  The
choice of nominal anchor may have important effects on other economic variables, such as the
distribution of output or the credibility of future stabilizations, but these effects are not addressed here.
4 
The primary concern is whether the choice of nominal anchor alters the path of real output in periods
following inflation stabilizations.  To address this question, I first identify the stabilizations to be used in
the analysis and discuss some inherent problems in their classification.  Second, I provide a graphical
analysis of growth, inflation, and money base growth around stabilization episodes.  Finally, I present
regression analysis of cross-country growth patterns before and after stabilizations and analyze the4
whether the choice of nominal anchor is endogenously determined by the state of the economy.   
II.a. Defining Stabilizations
One of the most difficult tasks in distinguishing the output effects of inflation stabilizations is to
identify the stabilizations.  Because the results of this study should allow comparison with previous
studies (i.e., the works of Kiguel and Liviatan 1992, Végh 1992, Calvo and Végh 1994, and Reinhart and
Végh 1994), I have chosen a similar set of major stabilizations.  These previous studies have based their
choice of stabilizations on the program's sustained success in holding down inflation.  Of course, this
criterion alone could bias the results of any statistical procedure and is a relevant criticism of previous
studies.  By choosing, ex post, those countries that have successfully stabilized, these studies may bias
the sample toward concluding that stabilization leads to economic growth.  Because the main objective
of this analysis is to determine any significant difference between monetary- and exchange rate-based
stabilizations, bias should not be a large problem as long as the criterion for choosing monetary- and
exchange rate-based stabilizations is the same. 
Another difficulty is the problem of dating the stabilization.  Does the program begin when it is
announced or when inflation actually starts to decline?  Dating a program a year earlier or later may
affect conclusions about the program's success.  For example, Uruguay announced an exchange rate-
based stabilization program in October 1978, but inflation had peaked a year earlier.  Did the
stabilization begin in 1978 or 1977?  To examine the sensitivity of the empirical results to this potential
problem, both such dates are analyzed.  One stabilization date is defined by the year in which the
program was announced, as defined by Calvo and Végh (1994).  The other stabilization date is the year
in which inflation actually peaked, as examined by Easterly (1996).  In eight of the 12 exchange rate-
based stabilizations analyzed (Table 1), inflation peaked a year or more before the stabilization program
was announced.  Inflation peaked three years prior to the announcement of Chile's 1978 exchange rate-
based stabilization, during its 1975 monetary-based stabilization.  Likewise, inflation peaked two years     
5In fact, the question of a strict money-based stabilization can also be raised.  Some money-based
stabilizations may begin with an initial one-time increase in the money stock followed by a decline in the
rate of money-growth.  Other money-based stabilizations just follow a decline in the rate of money-
growth.  The behavior of economic growth, however,  may differ between the two types of money-based
stabilizations.  See Uribe (1997) for an analysis of these possible effects. 
     
6The cases of Argentina 1989 and Chile 1975 are excluded from the set of exchange rate- based
stabilizations as defined by peak inflation (see Table 1) but are included in the set of exchange rate-based
stabilizations as defined by the announcement date. This is because the exchange rate-based stabilization
date as defined by peak inflation corresponds to the earlier date of money-based stabilization and cannot
be included as an independent stabilization.   
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prior to the announcement of Argentina’s 1991 exchange rate-based stabilization, during its 1989
monetary-based stabilization. 
A related problem is how to distinguish between a monetary- and exchange rate-based
stabilization.  Sometimes a country will first stabilize monetary aggregates and then, a few years later,
fix its exchange rate.  In 1975, for example, Chile began a monetary-based inflation stabilization and
steadily reduced inflation from 375 percent a year to nearly 10 percent in 1982. During this period of
declining inflation, in 1978, the exchange rate was fixed.  Was the 1978 fixed exchange rate a new
stabilization episode or a continuation of the 1975 monetary-based stabilization?  The same problem
arises for the Argentinean monetary-based stabilization in 1989 and the subsequent exchange rate-based
stabilization in 1991.  The 1985 Bolivian monetary-based stabilization is also difficult to categorize
because, although the government was intervening in the foreign exchange markets, it did not announce a
particular exchange rate policy, nor did it target a particular exchange rate.
5  These inherent problems of
categorization plague all studies on the subject.  Unfortunately, there are no controlled laboratory
experiments of inflation stabilizations.  I offer a sensitivity analysis of how the results change when
defining stabilization by peak inflation instead of the announcement date.
6    
II.b How Do the Data Look?
Growth. Charts 1 and 2 show real GDP growth three years before and three years after the     
7In terms of peak inflation, two stabilization episodes (Argentina 1977 and Brazil 1964) experienced a
decline in growth and six experienced an increase in growth (Argentina 1985, Brazil 1985, Mexico 1987,
Uruguay 1968 and 1977, and Israel 1984).   
     
8The format for this chart was based on Easterly (1996).
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stabilization, as defined by the announcement date (the first column in Table 1).  Data on yearly real
GDP growth are from the Summers and Heston Penn World Tables (version 5.6) and are augmented by
IMF data for the years after 1990. 
As one can see by examining the charts, there is a wide variety of experience among countries
that have used the exchange rate to stabilize inflation.  Growth usually, but not always, increases in the
year after the stabilization.  Nor is growth sustained more than one year after the stabilization.  In three
of the 12 exchange rate-based stabilization experiences, a decline in growth occurred the year after
stabilization (Brazil 1964, 1986 and Argentina 1991). Eight stabilization episodes experienced an
increase in growth the year after stabilization (Argentina 1967, 1978, and 1985; Mexico 1987; Uruguay
1968, 1978, and 1991; and Israel 1985).
7  Real GDP growth did not change much after the stabilization in
Chile in 1978.  It is interesting to note that the rate of growth after the Argentina 1991, Brazil 1986, and
Chile 1978 stabilizations appears to be a continuation of a change that began at least one to two years
earlier.
For the six monetary-based stabilizations, the picture looks a bit more uniform in the year after
the stabilization. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, real GDP tends to increase after MBS.  Five of
the six monetary-based stabilizations show higher growth; only Bolivia in 1985 appears to fit the stylized
facts of a monetary-based stabilization.    
Chart 3a summarizes the pattern of real GDP growth around exchange rate- and monetary-based
stabilizations.
8  Growth increases in the year after stabilization for both types of stabilizations.  Although
MBS starts from lower (indeed, negative) growth before stabilization, growth is higher in subsequent7
years.  As the chart also indicates, the median of the sample follows quite closely the mean. 
Chart 3b also summarizes the pattern of real GDP growth around monetary- and exchange rate-
based stabilizations, but in this chart peak inflation around the announcement date of the program defines
the year of stabilization.  In addition, the exchange rate-based stabilizations of Chile 1978 and Argentina
1991 (where inflation peaked during previous money-based stabilizations) are excluded.  When using
peak inflation as the date of stabilization, the pattern of real GDP growth is even more alike between
MBS and ERBS. In both programs, growth tends to bottom out during the year of stabilization and then
improves.  However, the level of growth that precedes and follows exchange rate-based programs is still
much higher than the level of growth around monetary-based programs.            
Inflation, money base growth, and devaluation.  Analysis of the relationship among
stabilization, inflation, money base growth, and devaluation is reflected in Charts 4 and 5.   One of the
most dramatic differences between exchange rate- and monetary-based stabilizations is in the rate of
inflation.  The median inflation rate during the year of stabilization for monetary-based stabilizations is
2,938 percent, while for exchange rate-based stabilizations it is 132 percent.  This pattern, which has not
been emphasized in the previous literature, is consistent with the hypothesis that the choice of
stabilization is endogenously determined by the state of the economy.  
To peg or manage the exchange rate, a high level of international reserves is useful, especially
when the government’s credibility is low after a period of high inflation.  Those economies that
experienced severe instability before a stabilization may not have the international reserves to fix or
manage the exchange rate, so they choose a monetary-based stabilization.  This appears to be the case. 
As shown in Chart 6, international reserves as a share of GDP the year before and during exchange rate-
based stabilizations are nearly twice as high as those before monetary-based stabilizations.  Reserves as a
share of GDP at the time of exchange rate-based stabilizations are slightly above their long-run average
from 1960-94.  For monetary-based stabilizations, they are less than 40 percent of their long-run average. 8
  
Another important feature of ERBS is that inflation and the rate of money growth typically peak
one to two years before the year the stabilization was announced.  This suggests that some type of
stabilization may take place before the announced exchange rate program.  Argentina 1967, 1978, and 
1991; Chile 1978; Uruguay 1978, 1991; and Israel 1985 all had inflation and money base growth rates
that peaked a year or more before the year of the announced ERBS.  Chile 1978 and Argentina 1991 are
certainly cases where monetary stabilizations were implemented several years earlier. 
Charts 7a and 7b summarize the path of money base growth around stabilizations.  Chart 7a
shows money base growth centered around the announcement date of the programs and 7b shows the
same but centered around the peak in inflation.  Basically, the charts show that inflation peaks in the
same year that the money base growth peaks, regardless of the type of stabilization (Chart 7b).  The only
difference between the stabilizations is that exchange rate-based programs are typically announced two
years after the peak in inflation and money base growth (Chart 7a).  
As has been discussed by Bruno (1991), Kiguel and Liviatan (1992), Végh (1992), and others, in
exchange rate-based stabilizations, the rate of inflation tends to fall more slowly than the rate of
devaluation, which causes a real exchange rate appreciation.  Not so widely known, however, is that the
same is true for monetary-based stabilizations.  In other words, real exchange rates tend to appreciate
after both monetary- and exchange rate-based stabilizations.  With the exception of Brazil 1990, all
monetary-based stabilizations are followed by inflation falling more slowly than the exchange rate. 
Chart 8 summarizes the pattern of real exchange rate appreciation after monetary- and exchange rate-
based stabilization. 
III. Economic Growth Around Inflation Stabilizations
The purpose of using section is to identify any statistically consistent relationship between the
type of inflation stabilization followed and the behavior of real output.  The hope is to capture any     
9Because autocorrelation in the error term was detected, Park’s method for first-order autocorrelation
correction in panel data was implemented.  The SAS procedure for time-series cross-section data
















empirical regularity in output growth around stabilizations so that some distinguishing features of
monetary- and exchange rate-based stabilizations can be identified.  
   The methodology used in this section is a variant of that used by Reinhart and Végh (1994) and
Easterly (1996).  Real GDP growth is regressed on a set of dummy variables, which represent the years
before and after stabilization, to determine if there is any above or below trend real GDP growth around
the year of stabilization. 
Fixed-effects equations were run for both types of stabilization programs utilizing the entire
pooled cross-country data set.  The data cover the years 1960 to 1994. Three years before and three years
after the stabilization are examined, as well as the year of stabilization itself.  The equations estimated
are
 where   is real GDP growth,  CountryDUMi are country i’s fixed effect,  ERBSDUMj ˆ Y
 and MBSDUMj are dummy variables for an exchange rate- and monetary-based stabilization and are
equal to 1 in year j and zero otherwise.  ", *, ,  and  (, are estimated coefficients, and µ and , are iid
error terms.   
Table 2 shows the regression analysis for growth patterns before and after stabilizations.
9  The10
first two columns in the table examine the behavior of aggregate real GDP growth around stabilization
dates that are defined by peak inflation.  The first column looks at the behavior of real GDP for
monetary-based stabilizations (equation 1), and the second column examines the behavior of real GDP
for exchange rate-based stabilizations (equation 2).  
For at least one year before monetary-based stabilizations, aggregate real GDP growth is
significantly less than its long-run trend.  In contrast, the years before exchange rate-based stabilizations
are not marked by aggregate real GDP growth that is significantly less than the trend rate.  In other
words, the economies that followed a monetary-based stabilization were in much worse shape before
stabilizing than those that picked an exchange rate-based stabilization (this was also seen visually in
Charts 3a and 3b).  This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that the choice of nominal anchor is
endogenously determined.  In economies that have experienced severe declines in output before
stabilization, international reserves may not be available, so, from the government’s perspective, the best
strategy for inflation stabilization is monetary-based stabilization.  Similarly, some sort of monetary or
fiscal stabilization may precede exchange rate-based stabilizations, so the actual output response after
ERBS is small.  For example, the 1975 Chilean monetary stabilization preceded its 1978 exchange rate-
based stabilization, after which growth did not change appreciably.   
In terms of determining if there is a "recession now versus later" trade-off, the crucial question
is: What is the pattern of growth in the years following the stabilization?  For both types of stabilizations,
growth during the year of stabilization is less than the trend rate of growth.  Looking at the first year after
stabilization, however, one can see that growth improved after both exchange rate-based and monetary-
based stabilizations.  Growth after exchange rate-based stabilizations was above trend, although not
significantly different from the trend.  Growth after monetary-based stabilization was still below trend,
but greater than the growth rate during the year of the stabilization.  Contrary to the stylized facts of
monetary- and exchange rate-based stabilizations, there does not appear to be a significant pattern of     
10Another test of robustness was done that changed the announcement year of stabilization to the
following year if the announcement was made in the last quarter of the year.  So, for example, Mexico’s
December 1987 stabilization was classified as a 1988 stabilization.  The basic results, however, were not
altered with this change.
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further decline after monetary-based stabilizations.  Both policies can produce improved growth after
stabilizing inflation.  
The fact that growth is significantly below trend after monetary-based stabilizations is not
necessarily an indication that money-based stabilization leads to recession.  Growth is closer to trend the
year after the stabilization than during the year of stabilization.  In fact, growth continues to improve for
at least three years after stabilization.        
How much do these results depend on the definition of stabilization?  To determine the
robustness of these results, I include the announced date of stabilization as defined by Calvo and Végh
(1994).  The results when using this definition are shown in columns 3 and 4.  There is little difference
between the results in columns 3 and 4 and those in columns 1 and 2.  There is a slight increase in growth
after the first year of both exchange rate-based and monetary-based stabilizations, and growth after
exchange rate-based stabilizations becomes significantly greater than the trend in the first year after
stabilization.
10    
Table 3 shows results of the same experiment as Table 2 but with per capita real GDP growth
rather than aggregate real GDP growth as the dependent variable.  The results using per capita real GDP
growth are essentially the same as those using aggregate real GDP growth. 
IV. Endogeneity in the Choice of Stabilization Program
Although economic growth improves after both exchange rate- and monetary-based inflation
stabilizations, the absolute level of growth is lower before and after monetary-based stabilizations.  The
hypothesis presented earlier suggested that perhaps the choice of stabilization is an endogenous one. 
Governments with little inflation-fighting credibility and no international reserves may have to choose a     
11For example, see Devarajan and Rodrik (1992).  For a general discussion of macroeconomic policy
and credibility issues, see Persson and Tabellini (1990).
     
12Drazen (1996) makes the important point that if the public takes into consideration the environment
in which a "tough" policy is followed, than a tough today may not signal more credibility but may be
associated with less credibility.  For example, if sticking to a fixed exchange rate regime today increases
the unemployment rate and political problems tomorrow, then the credibility the public assigns to the
policy may fall because the political environment of policymaker is taken into account.   Drazen notes
that "today’s choices affect tomorrow’s environment in such a way that playing tough may lower the
credibility of a tough policy."
12
monetary-based program.  In models where a country’s choice to follow a fixed exchange rate represents
a greater commitment to lower inflation than simply establishing a monetary growth target, the issue of
feasibility seems to be ignored.  In some models, it is assumed that the government decision maker bears
a fixed cost of deviating from an exchange rate commitment, such as a loss of offices or a loss of market
confidence.  In other models, a fixed exchange rate may signal something about a government’s
preference for inflation.
11  These ideas imply that countries with weak credibility but a true desire to
achieve lower inflation would find an exchange rate-based stabilization a superior strategy to follow
because economic agents more quickly lower their inflation expectations.  This is the reasoning behind
Jeffrey Sachs’ (1996) advocacy of pegged exchange rates for transition economies such as those of
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.     
It is not clear, however, why a country with a history of high inflation should be able to more
credibly commit itself to fixing the exchange rate than to maintaining a monetary growth rule.  In fact,
attempting to stabilize inflation with a fixed exchange rate but no international reserves and a history of
price instability is probably less credible than a monetary growth rule.  The all-or-nothing nature of the
fixed exchange rate commitment implies that it has little chance of being kept.
12  As a result, the
credibility of the inflation-fighting program and, hence, the choice of nominal anchor, may be
endogenously determined by the state of the economy.
The question addressed in this section is: After conditioning for factors that may effect the     
13Including inflation and international reserves as the only factors determining the type of stabilization
program is a very stringent test.  Other factors, such as fiscal spending, market liberalization, and
deregulation, are certainly important elements in determining movements in economic growth and may
also differ between types of stabilization programs.  
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choice of policy regime, is the level of economic growth different under monetary vs exchange rate
based programs?  If the level of international reserves and the rate of inflation can predict a monetary-
based stabilization, the inclusion of these factors in the growth equation may reduce or eliminate the
differential growth rates between monetary- and exchange rate-based stabilizations.  Monetary-based
stabilizations may not cause low growth but may themselves be chosen in times of low growth and low
international reserves.
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Before examining the role of international reserves and inflation in determining money-based
stabilizations, I examine a benchmark model of intervention.  The model is designed to address the
question of whether the pattern of growth differs between stabilizations.  It differs from the previous
analysis in two important ways.  First, lagged values of the growth are included in the equation to
explicitly account for the dynamic behavior of economic growth.  Second, a dummy variable for the year
after all stabilizations is included along with a dummy variable for the year after just monetary-based
stabilizations.  By including both dummy variables in the equation, examining the coefficient on
monetary based-stabilizations provides a simple test of whether growth differs between the two types of
stabilizations.  The benchmark intervention model under consideration is the following:
14
Where   is real GDP growth,  CountryDUMi is country i’s fixed effect,  ALLDUM is a dummy variable ˆ Y
for all the announced inflation stabilization programs and is equal to 1 in the year after the stabilization
and zero otherwise,  MBSDUM is a dummy variable for only monetary-based stabilizations and is equal15It is important to remember the difference between the date of stabilization defined by the
announcement date and the peak inflation date.  The announcement date refers to the date that the
government publicly committed to a program.  In the case of exchange rate-based programs, this date
refers to the date that an explicit exchange rate commitment was made.  It is the date the government
committed itself to defending the exchange rate with its stock international reserves. Thus, it is the
announcement date that is relevant for examining the endogeneity of the choice of program.
14
to 1 in the year after the stabilization and zero otherwise, " and are estimated coefficients, and µ is an
iid error term.
15
If growth the year after monetary-based stabilizations is significantly lower than exchange rate-
based stabilizations, the coefficient on MBSDUM,  , should be negative and significantly different from 4
zero.    and   indicate the growth dynamics after shocks.  It is expected that the effects of shocks are 1 2
temporary, which implies that  0 < |  + |<1.  Because growth is expected to improve gradually after 1 2
negative shocks (or decline after positive shocks), it is expected that 0< <1.    may either be positive 1 2
or negative, depending on whether growth monotonically approaches its trend or overshoots it.
Column 1 in Table 4 shows the estimation results of equation 3 using the announcement of the
program as the stabilization date.  As expected,  0 < |  + |<1 and 0< <1,  implying that the effects of 1 2 1
shocks are temporary and gradually return to trend.  Because    <0, growth overshoots its trend rate and 2
then returns to it.  No signs of autocorrelation are detected across equations.  
The positive and significant coefficient on  ALLDUM, suggests that average growth the year
after all stabilizations is above trend, which is consistent with the findings of Bruno and Easterly (1995). 
The negative and significant coefficient on MBSDUM suggests that growth the year after monetary-based
stabilizations is significantly below that of exchange rate-based stabilizations.  These results confirm that
the level of growth the year after monetary-based stabilizations is significantly less than that of exchange
rate-based stabilizations.       
16All the results of Table 4 are essentially the unchanged when money base growth is substituted for
inflation. 
15
The essential question is, however: How much of that difference in growth can be accounted for
by the government’s endogenous choice of the inflation-fighting program?  Are monetary-based inflation
stabilization programs typically chosen in periods of higher inflation and lower international reserves? 
To address this question, columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 include lagged inflation rates and the share of
international reserves in GDP.  If the rate of inflation and the level of international reserves are important
determinates of the choice of stabilization, including these variables in the regression equation may
eliminate the significance of the monetary-based intervention dummy variable.  
As shown in column 2, the inclusion of lagged inflation (INFt-1) in the model results in an
insignificant coefficient on the monetary-based intervention dummy variable.
16  Monetary-based
stabilizations take place in periods of higher inflation than do exchange rate-based stabilizations.  After
conditioning on inflation, the growth after money-based stabilizations is not significantly different than
exchange-rate based stabilizations.    
Column 3 in Table 4 includes the lagged share of international reserves in GDP.  Consistent with
the hypothesis that international reserves are an important element behind the government’s willingness
to pursue a fixed-exchange rate policy, we see that the lagged share of international reserves in GDP
(SRESt-1) further reduces the significance of the monetary-based intervention dummy variable.  Once the
endogenous determinates of stabilizations are controlled for, there does not appear to be a significant
difference in the level of growth between monetary- and exchange rate-based stabilizations. 
A more direct way determining whether the choice of stabilization is endogenous is by
examining whether the type of stabilization can be predicted by the size of international reserves.  The
question is: Are exchange rate-based stabilizations more likely to be chosen in countries with relatively     
17Given the previous analysis, it is likely that past inflation also would be important in predicting the
type of nominal anchor.  However, due to the small frequency of observations on exchange rate- and
monetary-based stabilizations, and large number of fixed effects, the equation’s degrees of freedom were
too small to estimate the full model.  In a separate multinomial analysis that included only inflation, I
found that higher inflation was negatively related to the choice of a exchange rate-based stabilization but
was not statistically significant.     
     
























higher or lower international reserves?
17  
   To address this question, a multinomial logit analysis of the following model is performed:
18
 
 For j = 1, 2.
Where T=1 is an exchange rate-based stabilization (ERB), T=2 is no stabilization (N), and T=0 is a
monetary-based stabilization (MB).  SRESQ is the quartile value of the share of international reserves in
GDP.  SRESQ takes the value of 4 if the share of international reserves in GDP falls in the highest
quartile of observations; it takes the value of 3 in the third quartile, and so on.  The same data set
described earlier is used.     
As seen in Table 5, the share of international reserves in GDP is an important and significant
predictor of the type of stabilization.  For example, moving up one quartile in the share of international
reserves in GDP (SRESQ), say from the second quartile to third quartile, would increase the probability17
of an exchange rate-based over a monetary-based stabilization by a factor of 9.1 ( d(PERB/PMB
)/dSRESQ|SRESQ=2= e
-1.326 + 1.549*2 * 1.549 = 9.1).   
V.  Concluding Remarks  
At first glance, many of the results presented in this study are not inconsistent with previous
studies on the choice of nominal anchor.  Indeed, like previous work, this study indicates that the rate of
economic growth is lower after monetary-based stabilizations than after exchange rate-based
stabilizations.  What is different about this study, however, is the analysis of the dynamics of economic
growth and the potential endogeneity in the choice of the stabilization program.  If the choice of a
monetary versus exchange rate-based stabilization is endogenously determined by the level of
international reserves and the height of past inflation, and if these factors are highly correlated with the
state of the economy and prospects for future growth, then it is likely that the economic environment
determines the type of stabilization.  The evidence suggests that this is the case.  
In general, the economies of those countries that choose monetary-based stabilizations appear to
be in much worse shape before inflation stabilization than those that choose exchange rate-based
stabilization.  In the years prior to monetary-based stabilization, economic growth is lower, international
reserves are lower, and inflation is higher than in the years prior to exchange rate-based stabilizations. 
Because a high level of international reserves is important when a government wants to fix its exchange
rate, it is only natural that governments would opt for exchange rate-based stabilizations only when
international reserves are relatively high.  It may also be the case that governments stabilize inflation and
deliberately build reserves prior to managing the exchange rate.  In fact, money base growth tends to
peak one to two years before exchange rate-based stabilizations.  Growth after monetary-based
stabilizations is not significantly different from exchange rate-based stabilizations when the analysis
controls for the level of international reserves and the rate of inflation. Contrary to the "recession-now-
versus-later" hypothesis, the growth dynamics of monetary-based stabilizations are similar to those of18
exchange rate-based stabilizations&that is, growth improves after both types of stabilization.  
An important avenue for future research is to formally endogenize the choice of nominal anchor
and explore how other factors, such as a country’s susceptibility to external shocks, influence the choice
of stabilization plan.  Ultimately, the question of policy credibility and its relationship (or lack of
relationship) to the choice of nominal anchor is what lies at the heart of the debate between exchange
rate- and monetary-based stabilization.                         19
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19 Year of Peak Inflation
Around Announcement of Plan
Exchange Rate-Based Stabilizations
Argentina:
  1967  March 1966
1978  December 1976
1985  June 1985
1991  April NA
20
Brazil:
1964  March 1964
1986  February 1985
Chile:
1978  February NA
21
Israel:
1985  July 1984
Mexico:
1987  December 1987
Uruguay
1968  June  1968
1978  October 1977













1990  August 199022
Table 2
Statistical Significance of Growth Patterns Before and After Stabilizations
(Pooled Cross-Sectional Data with Parks Correction for Autocorrelation) 





































































Observations 186 186 186 186
Note: t-values are in parentheses.  Fixed effects regressions were run for each
 type of stabilization.23
Table 3
Statistical Significance of Growth Patterns Before and After Stabilizations
(Pooled Cross-Sectional Data with Parks Correction for Autocorrelation) 





































































Observations 186 186 186 186
Note: t-values are in parentheses.  Fixed effects regressions were run for each 
type of stabilization.24
Table 4
Intervention Analysis of Growth Patterns Around Stabilizations
(Pooled Cross-Sectional Data with Fixed Effects) 































Observations 292 292 291
¯ R
2 0.163 0.165 0.192
LM test for 
autocorrelation
0.767 1.581 0.139
Note: t-values are in parentheses.  Fixed effects regressions
were run for each type of stabilization.  This LM test is
distributed as a P
2 with one degree of freedom.  The critical
value for the test at the 5 percent significance level is 3.84.25
Table 5
Multinomial Logit Analysis:  
Predicting Stabilizations by the Level of International Reserves
















PN is the probability of no stabilization, PERB is the probability of an exchange rate-based stabilization,
and PMB is the probability of a monetary-based stabilization.  Chart 1
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(Stabilization date = Announcement date)
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